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Abstract—Proof of security of cryptography protocols
theoretically establishes the strength of a protocol and
the constraints under which it can perform, it does not
take into account the overall design of the protocol. In
the past model checking has been successfully applied
to classical cryptography protocols to weed out de-
sign flaws which would have otherwise gone unnoticed.
Quantum key distribution protocols differ from their
classical counterparts, in their ability to detect the
presence of an eavesdropper while exchanging the key.
Although unconditional security has been proven for
both BB84 [3] and B92 [4] key distribution protocols, in
this paper we show that identifying an eavesdropper’s
presence is constrained on the number of qubits ex-
changed. We first model the protocols in Communicat-
ing Quantum Processes (CQP) [10] [8] and then explain
the mechanism by which we have translated this into
a PRISM model and how we analysed the protocols’
capabilities. We mainly focus on the protocols’ ability to
detect an active eavesdropper and the extent to which
an eavesdropper can retrieve the shared key without
being detected by either party. We then conclude by
comparing the performance of the protocols.
I. Introduction
Quantum cryptographic protocols have garnered much
acclaim in the last two decades for their ability to provide
unconditional security, which is not practically assured
by their classical counterparts. Commercial availability of
quantum infrastructure in the last decade has placed even
more emphasis on developing methodologies to ascertain
the reliability of protocols in practice. Even though, proto-
cols are theoretically secure, our experience with classical
protocols has shown that security can be compromised
during implementation. Since modelling, analysing and
verifying classical protocols have worked so well, develop-
ing techniques along these lines seems prudent for quantum
cryptographic protocols as well.
This is a pre-print version of a journal submission, calling for
comments from the audience.
The cornerstone of quantum cryptographic protocols is
the inherent probabilistic nature. Unlike classical protocols
which accommodates a passive eavesdropper, wherein the
eavesdropper can copy the bits and analyse them later,
quantum protocols mandate an active eavesdropper. This
constraint is promulgated by the no-cloning [11] theorem
which handicaps the eavesdropper from copying qubits. To
extract information from the qubits an eavesdropper will
inevitably resort to measuring them in a basis which might
be different from the encoding basis and thereby alters the
state of the qubit. This action is probabilistic in nature.
Moreover, quantum protocols also involve both classical
and quantum channels. Therefore we need a language
that is capable of modelling probabilistic phenomenon
and also takes into account both classical and quantum
communications.
Communicating Quantum Processes (CQP) [10] is a
language developed with the expert purpose of modelling
quantum protocols. CQP uses the communication prim-
itives of pi-calculus [9] and has capabilities for apply-
ing unitary operators, performing measurements, and a
static type system that differentiates between classical and
quantum communications. Hence CQP seems an obvious
choice for modelling quantum protocols. Reasoning along
the same lines, PRISM allows us to model probabilistic
transitions, as we show later, this allows to seamlessly
translate a CQP model into a PRISM model.
Previous work on analysis of BB84 by Papanikolaou [5]
has reasoned about the probability of detecting an eaves-
dropper and corroborates the claim made by Mayers in
his proof of unconditional security of BB84. However, this
work does not model BB84 in CQP. We first model BB84
in CQP, conver the CQP model into PRSIM and check the
validity of the observations made by Papanikolaou [5]. We
then proceed to show that B92’s eavesdropping detection
capabilities can be reasoned along the same lines.
To ensure brevity we have refrained from explaining
Quantum Mechanical primitives like unitary operators,
measurements and no-cloning theorem. One good resource
is Nielsen and Chuang’s work [7]. Also, we have only
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2provided an elementary introduction to CQP, only to
the extent to which we use it in this paper. A better
and complete resource would be Thimothy Davidson’s [8]
doctoral thesis.
II. Preliminaries
We are going to briefly explain quantum measurement,
and working of BB84 and B92 protocols.
A. Quantum Measurement
It is inherent with any quantum mechanical system that
any measurement done on the system will induce some
irreversible disturbances. We are going to rely on this
property of qubits heavily in any quantum cryptographic
protocols.
Any quantum system can be represented as a vector in
an n dimensional complex Hilbert space. Measuring this
quantum system can only give a set of priviliged results
namely those associated with the basis vectors of the state
space.
For example, consider a 2-dimensional complex Hilbert
spcae with |0〉 and |1〉 as basis vectors. Lets say the vector
|ψ〉 = α. |0〉 + β. |1〉 describes the system. If we try to
measure the system in the basis {0, 1}, then the system
changes to a new state, either |ψ′〉 = |0〉 or |ψ′〉 = |1〉
permanently. It has a probability |α|2 of changing into
|ψ′〉 = |0〉 and a probability |β|2 of changing into |ψ′〉 = |1〉.
Also, |α|2 + |β|2 = 1. We can also measure the system in
whichever basis that we choose. Lets measure the system
in another basis {+,−}, where
|+〉 = 1√2 (|0〉 + |1〉 and |−〉 = 1√2 (|0〉 − |1〉, then the
quantum state can be represented as |ψ〉 = (α+β)√2 (|+〉) +
(α−β)√
2 (|−〉).
Measuring this system in the basis {+,−} will yield |+〉
and |−〉 with probability (α+β)22 and (α−β)
2
2 respectively.
B. BB84 QKD protocol
A and B want to establish a secret for secure com-
munication. A sends the encoding of some bits in the
+,×basis to B on the quantum channel. B then chooses
a random sequences of bases and measures the qubit
sent by A in that basis. If the basis of Alice and Bob
are equal then the B obtains the classical bit chosen by
Alice other wise she randomly gets {0, 1}. A and B then
use the classical channel to exchange the basis and the
corresponding measurements of qubits to decide upon a
shared key or to detect the presence of an eavesdropper.
C. Understanding B92
Unlike BB84 where each classical bit has two different
encoding depending on the basis used, B92 has only one. In
other words there is a one to one correspondence between
the classical bits and qubits exchanged. If Alice wants to
send a classical bit 0 to Bob she sends →and if she wants
to send 1 she sends ↗. The rest of the steps involved are
the same as in BB84.
D. Eavesdropping Attacker
As mentioned earlier, whenever Eve measures the qubits
that are in transit to Bob from Alice, she makes a perma-
nent change to the state of qubits if she doesn’t use the
same basis as that of Alice. In BB84 protocol if on some
qubits both Alice and Bob use the same basis to encode
and measure but Bob decodes a classical bit different from
what Alice encoded, suggests the presence of Eve. In B92
as well, Alice and Bob should obtain the opposite results
when the encoding basis is the same, then an attacker is
present. We are assuming the qubit channel shared by all
the participants noiseless.
III. Formalising in CQP
A brief overview of CQP calculus is provided and then
we proceed to formalise both the protocols in CQP. An
example of BB84-Bit Commitment Protocol in CQP [10]
was give by Simon and Gay and our formalisation uses the
same techniques.
A protocol at any given point of time has multiple
participants, like Alice and Bob which are legitimate
entities involved and also adversaries like Eve. These
entities are collectively known as agents. Agents
communicate with each other via communication channels
to exchange information. The working of the agents is
encapsulated by processes. Every agent has more than
one process, and at any given time its possible that more
than one process is in action. These processes can be
reasonably thought of as states in finite state automatons
and every process transitions to another or terminates.
CQP allows us to impose a probabilistic distribution
across these transitions. Also processes in CQP can be
parametrised.
1) channels are declared by the new keyword.
For example to declare a new qubit channel, we
write (new qubitChannel:ˆ[Qbit]), where Qbit is the
data type qubitChannel is constrained to and ”ˆ”
identifies it as a channel.
2) variables can be declared within a process like so,
(qbit q).
3) Process Output: c![x].Pi+1 to send the data stored
by variable x along channel c and then proceed with
process Pi+1.
4) Process Input: c?[x].Pi+1 to receive along channel c
and then proceed with process Pi+1.
5) Process action: e.Pi+1 evaluates expression e and
then proceeds with process Pi+1
6) Process decision: ifethenPi+1elsePi+2 if the expres-
sion e evaluates to true then proceed with process
Pi+1 else Pi+2
7) Terminate: Pi.0 the process terminates after Pi.
3A. Formalising BB84
We identify that Alice, Bob are the primary agents of
the protocol and to analyse the effects of an eavesdropper
Eve becomes an agent of the system as well. As described
above channels can only transport messages of a particular
type. We have qubitChannel to transport qubits, intChannel
for integers and decisionChannel, decisionFlagChannel, ran-
domBitChannel for bits. Technically one bit channel would
suffice.
However having two different channels that are used at
two different stages in the protocol helps us to convert
the CQP-model into PRISM as will be elaborated in the
next section. We have also made use of List type, with
its associated functions of hd, tl, [] and @ for reading the
first element, dropping the first element, an empty list and
placing data at the tail of the list respectively. The use of
these functions is demonstrated by Gay et al. [10].
• System is parameterized by a bitList, which consti-
tutes the classical (see Figure 1). bits that need to
be exchanged between Alice and Bob
• Random agent creates a random bit and sends it via
the radomBitChannel
• Alice first sends the length of the number of bits to
be exchanged with Bob, i.e the length of bitList.
• Upon sending the length of the bit list, Alice contin-
ues with the process AliceSend. This is a recursive
process which terminates after sending all the bits
in bitList. AliceSend first receives a random bit from
randomBitChannel, if the value received is equal to
zero then the qubit q is encoded in the rectilinear
basis else it is encoded in the diagonal basis. (qubit
q) creates a new qubit q initialised to |0〉. Hence
an operation of X on q to create |1〉 and X or
X,H to convert it into |+〉 and |−〉 respectively.
AliceSend then sends the qubit q via qubitChannel
to be received by Bob. The random bits are stores in
encodeBitList to be used later when both the entities
decide upon the key.
• Bob receives the length of the bitList and then
continues with BobReceive process. Like AliceSend,
this is a recursive process which terminates after
receiving all the bits. BobReceive then uses a random
bit from randomBitChannel, if this bit is zero then
Bob measures the received qubit in the rectilinear
basis else in the diagonal basis. We used a list that
stores a couplet, where we store the random bit and
the corresponding measurement.
• After exchanging the qubits, Alice and Bob continue
with AliceReveal and BobFinal respectively. AliceRe-
veal sends the basis that she used for encoding via
the decisionBitChannel. BobFinal upon receiving this
basis elements checks whether the basis he measured
in the same as of that of Alice in which case, he sends
an acknowledgement via decisionFlagChannel to Alice
and the corresponding bit he measured. Alice checks
if the measurement that Bob made is the same as
that of the intended bit. Since we are dealing with
channels without any noise, if the measurement Bob
made does not match, Alice straight away confirms
the presence of an attacker and sends an eveDetect
flag to Bob.
B. Formalising B92
Since B92 and BB84 only differ in how they encode the
qubits, we can modify the CQP formalisation of BB84 for
B92 (see Figure 2). AliceSend does not encode the qubit
in a random basis. If the bitList element is equal to zero
then she sends |0〉 else if the element in equal to one then
|+〉 is exchanged. With few modifications to AliceSend in
BB84, we can adopt it model B92. These modifications are
presented in Figure 2.
IV. Modelling and Analysis in PRISM
Conversion from CQP to PRISM is a step by step
process. This conversion for a subset of commands has
been done by Ware in his Master’s thesis [6]. We are going
to use the same procedure (See Appendix for the PRISM
models). In the previous section we have mentioned that
we have used List type. Unfortunately a parallel for this
type does not exist for PRISM. To overcome this handicap
we will have to modify the model, in both the protocols
the public discussion starts after both the parties have
exchanged all the qubits. Instead in the PRISM model
after every qubit exchange, both the parties proceed to
exchange the encoding basis and measured bit to establish
the validity of the qubit. This way we can ensure that the
original characteristics of the protocol remain intact.
• all the channels in the CQP model are defined as
global variables in the PRISM model.
• the PRISM model constitutes of three modules rep-
resenting the different agents in the CQP modelling
• on the qbitChannel the messages to be exchanged are
limited to [0..3] with 0 representing |0〉, 1 for |1〉, 2
for |+〉 and 3 for |−〉.
• when Eve is detected, both Alice and Bob cease to
exchange any more qubits and reach their end state.
• like in the CQP model we do not create a module
for Random, rather all the parties create their own
random bits either zero or one with equal probability.
• after choosing a random basis to measure in there is
a one-fourth probability of any of the four outcomes.
• the number of bits to be exchanged is set by N the
global variable. We check the properties of the model
by varying the value of N . Alice and Bob iterate
constrained by the value N and are synchronised by
the label loop.
• Alice and Bob modules terminate either after ex-
changing N qubits or after detecting Eve and are
synchronised by stop.
4
5A. Analysis of BB84
With the models we have made in PRISM we are going
to show there is a non zero probability with which the
eavesdropper can be detected and how this probability
varies with the number of photons exchanged.
PRISM is capable of calculating probabilities of the
form Pσ,Φ = Pr{σ |= Φ}, i.e, given a PRISM model
σ, we can calculate the probability with which the
property Φ holds. Φ is expressed in PCTL. We have two
models σ1 and σ2 for random-substitution and intercept-
resend, respectively. Both these models are parametrised
by N the number of qubits that both the parties exchange.
Let PnED = Pr{σn(N) |= Φ1} for n ∈ {1, 2},
for the probability of eavesdropper detection and
PnCM = Pr{σn(N) |= Φ2} for n∈ {1, 2} for the probability
of the eavesdropper making correct measurements for
more than half of the qubits. n = 1 for random-substitution
and n = 2 for intercept resend. We also have N ∈ [1, 20],
i.e, we start to find these probabilities starting from one
qubit being exchanged to twenty.
Φ1 and Φ2 are to be expressed in PCTL. Φ1 is the
PCTL formula corresponding to when the eavesdropper is
detected. From the PRISM model for BB84 (in Appendix
A), whenever an eavesdropper is detected Alice is in
aliceState=15 and Bob is in state bobState=10. The corre-
sponding expression for Φ1 and their property expression
in PRISM:
Φ1 = {(aliceState = 15) ∧ (bobState = 10)}
P=?[F(aliceState=15)&(bobState=10)]
Similarly for Φ2 which gives the probability of eaves-
dropper measuring more than half of the exchanged qubits
correctly is
Φ2 = true U (correctMeasurement > N/2)
P=?[F(correctMeasurement> N2 )]
N P 1ED P
2
ED
5 0.822 0.5512
10 0.9577 0.7698
15 0.9899 0.8819
20 0.9976 0.9394
TABLE I: Probability of detecting eavesdropper for BB84-
QKD
N P 1CM P
2
CM
5 0.2458 0.4370
10 0.0501 0.2111
15 0.0188 0.1510
20 0.00425 0.0756
TABLE II: Probability of eavesdropper measuring more
than half of the qubits correct for BB84-QKD
TABLE I and TABLE II have probabilities that are
observed from PRISM. Using the Curve Fitting tool of
Fig. 4: Probability of detecting eavesdropper for BB84
Random Substitution
Fig. 5: Probability of detecting eavesdropper for BB84
Intercept Resend
MATLAB, and using the Marquardt-Levenberg nonlinear
least squares algorithm for curve-fitting we have come up
with the equation that best fits these probabilities.
We observed that
P 1ED ≈ Pr{σ1(N) |= Φ1} = (1− (0.75)e−0.2877N )
P 2ED ≈ Pr{σ2(N) |= Φ1} = (1− (0.8750)e−0.1335N )
and
P 1CM ≈ Pr{σ1(N) |= Φ2} = (0.8108)e−0.2795N
P 2CM ≈ Pr{σ2(N) |= Φ2} = (0.6750)e−0.1072N
Since P 1ED > P 2ED, the probability of eavesdropper
getting detected is higher when the eavesdropper resorts
to random-substitution.
Also it has to be noted that:
lim
N→∞
P 1ED = lim
N→∞
P 2ED = 1
6Fig. 6: Probability of measuring more than N2 qubits
correctly for BB84 Random Substitution
Fig. 7: Probability of measuring more than N2 qubits
correctly for BB84 Intercept Resend
which suggests as the number of qubits exchanged in-
creases so does the chances of detecting an eavesdropper.
lim
N→∞
P 1CM = lim
N→∞
P 2CM = 0
reaffirms the theoretical results obtained by Mayers [3],
wherein he states
”amount of Shannon’s information available to Eve must
decrease exponentially fast as N increases.”. Both these
observations reaffirm the results obtained by Papanikolaou
[5].
B. Analysis of B92
We use the same notations as in the previous subsection.
The only change being the PCTL expressions. Referring
to PRISM model for B92(Appendix B), eavesdropper is
detected when aliceState=11 and bobState=10.
Φ1 = {(aliceState = 11) ∧ (bobState = 10)}
P=?[F(aliceState=15)&(bobState=10)]
φ2 = true U (correctMeasurement > N/2)
P=?[F(correctMeasurement> N2 )]
N P 1ED P
2
ED
5 0.8665 0.7123
10 0.9683 0.89812
15 0.9924 0.96392
20 0.9976 0.98722
TABLE III: Probability of detecting eavesdropper for B92-
QKD
Fig. 8: Probability of detecting eavesdropper for B92 Ran-
dom Substitution
Fig. 9: Probability of detecting eavesdropper for B92 In-
tercept Resend
7N P 1CM P
2
CM
5 0.2458 0.3345
10 0.0501 0.1083
15 0.0201 0.0592
20 0.0042 0.0199
TABLE IV: Probability of eavesdropper measuring more
than half of the qubits correct for BB84-QKD
Fig. 10: Probability of measuring more than N2 qubits
correctly for B92 Random Substitution
Fig. 11: Probability of measuring more than N2 qubits
correctly for B92 Intercept Resend
After using the curve fitting algorithm to approximate
the results to an equation we have:
P 1ED ≈ Pr{σ1(N) |= Φ1} = (1− (0.75)e−0.2877N )
P 2ED ≈ Pr{σ2(N) |= Φ1} = (1− (0.8125)e−0.2795N )
and
P 1CM ≈ Pr{σ1(N) |= Φ2} = (0.8108)e−0.2795N
P 2CM ≈ Pr{σ2(N) |= Φ2} = (0.7272)e−0.1821N
We make the following obeservations:
lim
N→∞
P 1ED = lim
N→∞
P 2ED = 1
.
lim
N→∞
P 1CM = lim
N→∞
P 2CM = 0
.
Like the inferences made for BB84, the chances of detect-
ing an eavesdropper increases with the number of qubits
exchanged and also the number of correct measurements
that an eavesdropper can make decreases exponentially
with the number of qubits exchanged. But unlike in BB84,
for B92 we have P 1ED < P 2ED, hence the probability of
eavesdropper detection is higher during intercept-resend
than in random substitution.
C. Comparison between BB84 and B92
Quite strangely we observe that with respect to random
substitution type of attack, both the protocols perform
identically. This is substantiated by the equations
P 1CM ≈ Pr{σ1(N) |= Φ2} = (0.8108)e−0.2795N
and
P 1ED ≈ Pr{σ1(N) |= Φ1} = (1− (0.75)e−0.2877N )
However with respect to intercept resend style attacks they
differ markedly, as evidenced by Fig. 12 and Fig. 13.
Fig. 12: BB84 and B92 Comparison for Intercept Resend
eavesdropper detection
B92 performs better in terms of eavesdropper detection
as the probability approaches unity faster than B92 and in
terms of decreased number of correct measurements that
can be made by the eavesdropper.
8Fig. 13: BB84 and B92 comparison for Intercept Resend
correct measurements by eavesdropper
V. Conclusion
We have successfully modelled BB84 protocol in CQP,
showed the process in which we have created PRISM
models from the CQP models and analysed the properties
using PCTL. We also corroborate the observations made
in earlier research with our analysis. We then extended
the technique to B92-QKD protocol and compare the
performance of the two. We infer that B92 is more resilient
against an eavesdropper, with its ability to take fewer
qubits than BB84 in identifying an eavesdropper and then
potentially reducing the number of correct measurements
the eavesdropper can make.
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